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INTRODUCTION
This Article aims to add another piece to a so far still puzzling
picture at the interface of intellectual property and antitrust laws. While
past and current discussions mostly revolve around the notion that only
one—either Antitrust or IP laws—can prevail, the author favors a
differentiated understanding.
This Article compares how IP licensing is scrutinized by antitrust
regimes in the European Union (EU) and the United States. The result
of that comparison leads to the conclusion that any attempted resolution
of the IP-Antitrust “dilemma” will remain inadequate as long as it is
“antitrust-based,” that is, regulated by antitrust laws or guidelines
designed by antitrust-agencies. Unlike by other current approaches, the
overall validity of substantive antitrust concerns regarding IP licensing is
not called into question, however. It is the institutional setup in which
the antitrust policies regarding IP exploitation are designed and
enforced that is proposed to be in need of change. The author argues
that antitrust concerns can and should be accounted for through proper
construction and application of the IP laws themselves.
The proposed “IP-based” approach to IP licensing is claimed to be
beneficial in at least two respects: it maintains the dogmatic clarity of
the IP laws while preserving the bargain underlying the grant of
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, this Article suggests that an
“IP-based” regulation of licensing activities will—despite initially
increased costs—in the long run be more cost efficient than current
approaches and therefore also be economically preferable.
1
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) confer exclusive rights to their
owner. This exclusivity of IPRs is often described as providing
“monopoly-power,” which, were it true, would stand in opposition to
antitrust legislation aiming at the control or even breakup of
monopolies and at the promotion of competition. It has been shown
more than once, however, that this view on IPRs is based on a
2
misconception of the term “monopoly.”

1. For purposes of this Article “IPRs” refer to patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and
know-how.
2. See Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From
Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 189 (1997); see also United States
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933); Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao,
Some Reflections on the Antitrust Treatment of Intellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603,
608 (1995).
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Nevertheless, questions traditionally dealt with in antitrust laws
frequently arise when IPRs are exploited, especially by licensing. It is
almost inherent in license agreements that the licensor imposes
restrictions, for instance, as to the territory in which the licensee may
use the IPR. Such restrictions in general trade (e.g. sales or distribution
contracts) have always been under antitrust scrutiny. It appears logical,
therefore, that IPR-licensing agreements containing such exclusivity
restrictions should be subject to antitrust control as well. The
perception of the interplay between IP and antitrust has changed over
the years. It has rarely been called into question, however, that the
legality of IP-licensing terms should be analyzed under antitrust laws. It
further went unchallenged that the specialized agencies dealing with
antitrust violations took on the task to review IP licenses.
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission (“the Agencies”) issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Antitrust Guidelines”). These
Guidelines state the general enforcement policy of the Agencies
3
concerning IP licensing. Thereby the Agencies manifested their claim
to scrutinize IP-licensing agreements. In the same spirit, the
Commission of the European Union (“the Commission”) in 2004 issued
a renewed “block exemption” regulation for certain technology-transfer
4
agreements (“TTBER”). This regulation renders Article 81(1) of the
5
Treaty establishing the European Community (“ECT”) inapplicable on
6
certain kinds of IPR-licensing agreements. The mere fact that certain
IP licenses are regulated in regard to Article 81(1) ECT establishes that
the EU—like the United States—regards IPR licensing as an antitrust
issue.
However, court decisions in the United States as well as in Europe
give reason to question this general assumption of the Agencies’
supervisory power over IP licenses. In Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
7
Reynolds, the court found that the analysis to prove copyright misuse is
3. US DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (1995) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines].
4. Commission Regulation 772/2004 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 127) 11 (EC) [hereinafter
TTBER]. This regulation replaced Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements,
1996 O.J. (L 031) (EC) [hereinafter TTBER 240/96].
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29,
2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37 [hereinafter ECT].
6. TTBER, supra note 4.
7. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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“similar to but separate from the analysis necessary to a finding of an
8
antitrust violation.” This judgment could be read to suggest that
although IPR licensing might touch on both antitrust and IP-law issues,
the respective statutory regimes have a distinct realm of applicability.
Once it has been determined which body of law prevails, only its
distinctive tests must be employed. With this reading, the Agencies
might not be the authorities to issue general guidelines on the treatment
or evaluation of IP licenses. In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent
9
10
Ink, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that an IPR does not of itself
11
confer market power.
Thereby it ruled out the “monopolypresumption” long held. As a consequence, arguably, the Agencies now
12
have to demonstrate a restraint of trade to justify antitrust scrutiny of
13
IPR-licensing agreements.
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has also established that the
ownership of an IPR does not confer market power and that conduct
that falls within the scope of an IPR—and this generally includes
14
licensing—can never be reviewed in relation to antitrust laws. Thus, in
both major IPR-producing jurisdictions, IP licensing is under the
general scrutiny of the antitrust authorities despite the fact that, in both
jurisdictions, courts have issued judgments suggesting that such a
general antitrust scrutiny of IPR licenses might be misplaced.
The interface of IPRs and antitrust laws as it appears in the context
of license agreements should therefore be revisited. It needs to be
clarified if the Commission’s and the Agencies’ approaches are valid or
if they unduly scrutinize legitimate practices of IPR owners. The
following analysis introduces the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines
and compares the legal status of both sets of rules including their scope
and basic principles. This comparison will first show if and to what
extent the antitrust views on IPR exploitation vary between Europe and
the United States. Secondly, it will serve as a starting point for an
8. Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
9. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
10. In this case a patent.
11. 547 U.S. at 45.
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The exact meaning seems to be unclear; “restraint of
trade” is often used as an umbrella term covering different types of anticompetitive behavior.
For details, see PHILIPP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 93-99 (2d ed. 2000).
13. Unless, of course, the parties are engaged in plainly anticompetitive behavior, for
instance, the division of markets.
14. See cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995
E.C.R. ¶ 48.
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analysis of the merits of the Agencies’ and the Commission’s general
approach. It will be analyzed to what extent this approach is coherent
15
with intellectual property law legislation. It will be suggested that the
“external” antitrust perspective on IPR licensing agreements is legally
questionable and unnecessary. To remedy some of the perceived
disadvantages identified in the current approach, a new, IP-driven
approach to the analysis of IP licenses will be suggested. This approach
attempts to step away from the “isolated” application of the antitrust
system and suggests an integrated regulatory system based on the
specialized IP agencies and courts.
I. TTBER AND ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
The TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines both evaluate and limit
IPR licensing from the antitrust perspective, i.e., guided by antitrust
concerns and objectives. Apart from this similarity, by their very nature
(regulation vs. guideline) and due to the different jurisdictions they
emerge from, the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines form two
distinct approaches to deal with the interface of antitrust laws and IPRs.
A. Articles 81(1) and (3) ECT and Block Exemption Regulations
To understand the different approaches, and especially the TTBER,
one first has to consider the legal environment of the TTBER.
Article 81(1) ECT prohibits all agreements between undertakings
that may affect trade between member states and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition
within the common market. According to Article 81(3) ECT, an
agreement is exempt from the prohibition of Article 81(1) ECT if it is
beneficial for consumers. To benefit consumers, the agreement must
contribute to the improvement of production or distribution of goods or
promote technical or economic progress.
Prior to May 1, 2004, exemptions according to Article 81(3) ECT
required an evaluation and a subsequent formal decision by the
Commission. This procedure was criticized for giving the Commission a
monopoly on decisions about the antitrust relevance of agreements
16
while producing enormous administrative costs. To reduce these costs
and provide legal certainty for undertakings, the Council of the
15. Obviously, no full comparative analysis is possible. It is the underlying, generalized
basis of IP laws that is compared.
16. Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, Recital 3 [hereinafter Council
Regulation 1/2003].
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17

European Union passed Regulation 19/65/EEC. In accordance with
this regulation, the Commission could and did issue “block exemption
regulations,” exempting categories of practices that are considered to
18
normally be consistent with Article 81(1) ECT.
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, which took effect May 1, 2004, brought
about fundamental changes. According to its Article 1(2), agreements
that fall within the scope of Article 81(3) ECT are now automatically
legal without prior evaluation by the Commission. This change
necessarily affected the block exemption regulations issued by the
19
Commission. Prior to Regulation (EC) 1/2003, undertakings had to
apply for exemption by the Commission even if they believed their
20
agreement to be “block exempted.” Now, the possibility to obtain a
formal exemption is unavailable. Unlike in the United States, there is
furthermore no option to obtain an (non-binding) informal evaluation
21
of the validity of a license agreement. According to the new legislative
approach they are unnecessary anyway.
The flipside of this new approach is that the undertakings bear a
heavy burden of legal uncertainty. They have to determine and
evaluate all factors relevant for the analysis of Article 81(3) ECT as well
as the factors concerning the applicability of a block exemption. Should
the determination by the undertakings differ from a subsequent
evaluation by the Commission (for example, in the course of antitrust
litigation), the agreement will be declared void due to a violation of
Article 81(1) ECT.
17. Council Regulation 19/65/EEC, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. (36) 1 [hereinafter
Council Regulation 19/65/EEC].
18. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1475/95 On the Application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty of Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Service Agreements,
1995 O.J. (L 145) 1; Commission Regulation 2790/1999, On the Application of Article 81(3)
of the Treaty to Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336).
19. Josef Drexl, Die neue Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung für TechnologietransferVereinbarungen im Spannungsfeld von Ökonomisierung und Rechtssicherheit, GRUR INT. 716,
719 (2004) (legitimately questions if after Regulation 1/2003 the block exemption regulations
are still necessary, as all agreements within the scope of Article 81(3) ECT are automatically
exempt).
20. In practice most undertakings, instead of applying for such exemption, relied on the
informal, but much faster, “comfort-letters” by which the Commission acknowledged that, by
the facts presented, it would not object to the agreement. See KNUT W. LANGE, HANDBUCH
ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN KARTELLRECHT, 192 (2001).
21. For the United States, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2006), 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2007). In
the EU the availability of comfort letters is unclear. Compare VALENTINE KORAH,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 26 (2006) (implying
a general availability of comfort letters), with Johannes Zöttl, Das neue EG-Kartellrecht für
Technologietransferverträge, WRP 33, 46 (2005) (F.R.G.) (arguing against the availability).
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B. The New TTBER
Within this new general framework, on May 1, 2004, the new
22
TTBER came into effect. It replaced the previous block exemption
from 1996 and introduced the Commission’s “more economic,” i.e.,
23
economic-based approach, to IPR licensing. The TTBER is based on
three different assumptions. First, the Commission is of the opinion
that intellectual property laws and competition laws share the basic
objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of
24
resources. Second, the IPR owner must not be unduly restricted in the
exploitation of his IPRs so as to allow him to recover sufficient
25
monetary gain including recovery of sunk costs.
Third, there is no
presumption that IPR licensing as such gives rise to competition law
26
concerns. To the contrary, “[t]echnology transfer agreements can give
rise to economic efficiencies that outweigh the negative impact of
restrictions that might be indispensable to the attainment of such
27
efficiencies.”
According to Article 2(1) TTBER, only technology transfer
agreements between two undertakings can be block exempted. Multi28
party agreements fall outside the scope of the TTBER. Furthermore,
a technology-transfer agreement must concern the production of
“contract products”—that is, goods or services which are produced with
29
If the main purpose of an
or incorporate the licensed technology.
agreement is not the production and distribution of a contract product,
30
the agreement falls outside the scope of the TTBER.
The TTBER only covers license agreements concerning patents,
know-how, mixed patent/know-how agreements, design rights, and

22. In conjunction with the TTBER, the Commission issued the Commission Notice
C/2004, 2004 O.J. (C101/2) Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
technology transfer agreements [hereinafter “Commission Guidelines”]. Its purpose is “to
provide guidance on the application of the TTBER.” See id. at I.7.
23. See TTBER, supra note 4, Recital 4 (the influence of economics to European laws
on antitrust); see Drexl, supra note 19, at 717.
24. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7.
25. Id. ¶ at 8.
26. See id. at ¶ 35.
27. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 35.
28. Under Council Regulation 19/65 EEC, supra note 17, at 35. The Commission is not
empowered to block exempt technology transfer agreements concluded between more than
two undertakings. Id.
29. See TTBER, supra note 4, art. 1 lit. f.; Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 41.
30. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶¶ 41, 45.
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31

software. Agreements merely relating to trademark or copyright
32
licensing (except for software) are not covered by the TTBER.
Within this framework the new TTBER provides a “safe harbor” in
which licensing agreements will not be challenged for antitrust reasons.
This safety zone exists upon two conditions: first, it requires certain
market-share thresholds not to be exceeded by the contracting parties;
second, the agreement must not include any of the so called “hardcore
restrictions” exhaustively listed in Article 4 TTBER. If one of these
requirements is not met, the entire agreement lies outside of the safe
harbor and is subject to individual assessment under Article 81(1), (3)
33
ECT. Even worse, the inclusion of a hardcore restriction will in most
34
cases render the entire agreement void.
Article 5 TTBER finally contains so-called “excluded restrictions.”
Agreements containing those clauses will not be void in their entirety.
Only the specific term will require individual assessment in light of
35
Article 81(1), (3) ECT.
1. Market-Share Thresholds
The Commission believes that an agreement’s impact on the market
36
A
is insignificant if the parties have no substantial market power.
collective market share up to twenty percent if the contracting parties
are competitors and thirty percent if they are not competitors is
37
The inclusion of marketregarded as insubstantial market power.
share thresholds is motivated by the Commission’s “economic-based
approach” that bases the exemption of an agreement on the assessment
38
of its impact on the relevant market. The relevant market for purposes
of the TTBER is determined according to the rules set forth in the
39
market-definition guidelines.
The TTBER therefore follows the
demand-market principle: goods or services that are substitutable from
31. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(b).
32. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 50.
33. Just because an agreement does not fall within the scope of the TTBER does not,
on the other hand, allow for the presumption that it constitutes an antitrust violation
according to Article 81(1) ECT. See TTBER, supra note 4, Recital 12.
34. See TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1), (2); Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶
75.
35. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 107.
36. TTBER, supra note 4, Recitals 4, 10, and 11.
37. Id.
38. Id. TTBER, supra note 4 at Recital 4.
39. Commission Notice 97/C, 1997 O.J. (C372) 5. See Commission Guidelines, supra
note 22, ¶ 19.
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the consumer’s perspective as to their quality, usability, and price,
40
constitute the relevant market. The same test applies for technology
markets.
2. Hardcore Restrictions—Article 4 TTBER
Technology-transfer agreements must not include any of the socalled “hardcore” restrictions exhaustively listed in Article 4 TTBER in
41
order to qualify for block exemption. The agreement of any of these
terms will render the entire transfer agreement void unless it qualifies
for individual exemption under Article 81(3) ECT. The Commission
has made clear, however, that in its opinion, a hardcore restriction will
only in exceptional circumstances be in line with the requirements of
42
Article 81(3) ECT.
Article 4 TTBER differentiates between hardcore restrictions in
43
agreements between competing undertakings and such between not
44
competing undertakings.
In addition, Article 4(1) TTBER further
distinguishes between reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements. As
reciprocal agreements between competing undertakings pose a
substantial threat to competition, these agreements face the highest
45
The Commission treats non-reciprocal
level of antitrust scrutiny.
46
agreements more gently. It considers those terms to oftentimes be in
line with the objective of IPRs. They can protect legitimate interests of
47
the parties even if they are competitors.
Article 4(1) TTBER prohibits competing undertakings from
48
49
agreeing on fixed resale prices, output restrictions, allocation of
50
markets or customers, and the restriction of use of licensee’s own
51
technology.
The prohibited allocation of markets or customers
40. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 12, IIA, § 530a.
41. The former TTBER 240/96 contained a “black list” of forbidden clauses and a
“white list” of those terms generally acceptable. Thus, some commentators have also labeled
Article 4 TTBER “black listed” provision to stress the new approach the Commission takes
with this TTBER, one should refrain, however, from using the old terminology.
42. Id. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶¶ 18, 75.
43. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
44. Id. at art. 4(2).
45. See id. at ¶ 78.
46. Id. at ¶83.
47. See id. at ¶ 83.
48. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1) lit. a.
49. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. b.
50. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. c.
51. Id. at art. 4(1) lit. d.
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contains seven exceptions that mirror some of the typical problems
arising at the interface of antitrust laws and IPRs.
According to Article 4(1)(c)(i) TTBER, field-of-use restrictions do
not form a hardcore restriction and are exempted within the market
52
share threshold of twenty percent according to Article 2 TTBER.
Articles 4(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) TTBER exempt certain exclusive and sole
53
licenses.
Reciprocal exclusive licenses are always prohibited; nonreciprocal exclusive licenses are exempted within the market-share
threshold of twenty percent. Sole licenses are always exempted
irrespective of their nature as reciprocal or non-reciprocal licenses.
Furthermore, sales restrictions, captive use, and second source
54
limitations can be exempted.
Article 4(2) TTBER lists price restrictions, territorial restrictions on
the licensee, and restrictions on active or passive sales to end-users by a
licensee who sells by retail, as prohibited agreements between non55
competing undertakings. The territorial restrictions are not absolute,
however, but include a number of exceptions. Broadly speaking,
passive sales into territories or to customer groups exclusive to the
56
licensor do not form a hardcore violation. Furthermore, the limitation
to production for the licensee’s own use, including distribution as spare
57
parts, is consistent with EU competition law. Sales provisions aimed at
the protection of certain distributive systems are exempted by virtue of
58
Articles 4(2)(b)(iv), (v), and (vi).
3. Excluded restrictions—Article 5 TTBER
The Commission excludes certain provisions from the block
exemption. These provisions are potentially harmful to competition,
59
although there is no presumption of anti-competitiveness. The terms
may or may not infringe Article 81(1) ECT. If they do, they are invalid
and unenforceable. The difference between these and the “hardcore

52. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 90; Volker Schumacher & Christoph
Schmid, Die neue Gruppenfreistellungsverordung für Technelogietransfer-Vereinbarungen,
GRUR 1, 8 (2006).
53. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1)(c)(i)-(iii); see Commission Guidelines, supra note
25, ¶¶ 87, 89.
54. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 4(1)(c)(iv)-(vii).
55. Id. at art. 4(2)(a)-(c).
56. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
57. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(iii).
58. Id. at art. 4(2)(b)(iv)-(vi).
59. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 107.
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restrictions” in Article 4 TTBER is that an excluded provision will not
“infect” the entire agreement. The respective clause is invalid; the
remainder of the contract will stay in force. Again, the assessment of
whether an excluded term is coherent with Article 81(1) ECT lies with
60
the undertakings.
Article 5(1) TTBER is concerned with grant-back clauses and non61
challenge-provisions, while Article 5(2) TTBER prohibits terms that
inhibit a licensee from exploiting his own technology or limit his ability
62
to do research and development. According to Articles 5(1)(a) and
(b) TTBER, the licensee must not be obliged to either grant an
exclusive license or to even transfer severable improvements (as defined
in Article 1(1)(n) TTBER) to the licensor or any third party designated
63
by him. This stems from the presumption that the licensee will have
no incentive to invest in improving the technology if he cannot himself
64
exploit such improvements.
Any such clause is therefore seen to
directly inhibit innovation. While this is the general assumption, one
must not forget that any of the excluded provisions are subject to
65
individual assessment under Articles 81(1) and (3) ECT. Therefore,
other factors may exist in the individual case that render such a clause
66
permissible. One of these “positive” criteria is consideration. The
payment of consideration as such will not go so far as to create the
presumption that an exclusive grant-back clause does not violate Article
67
81(1) ECT. However, the Commission rightly acknowledges that with
the prospect of adequate remuneration, a licensor might very well be
willing to further the licensed technology and thus promote
68
innovation.
Besides possible payments, the general market position of the
69
The
licensor can determine permissibility of a grant-back clause.
stronger the licensor’s position in the market, the more important the
60. Id.
61. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(a)-(c).
62. Id. at art. 5(2).
63. Id. at art. 5(1)(a)-(b).
64. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 109.
65. See ECT, supra note 5.
66. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 110.
67. See id.
68. Id. While consideration is irrelevant in the regulation itself, its mention in the
Guidelines nevertheless forms a clear turnaround in the Commission’s attitude. Cf. KORAH,
supra note 23 at 69. In Velcro SA v. Aplix SA, the Commission ignored a provision for paying
reasonable compensation for grant-back of improvements. Case 410/85, 4C MLR 157 (1985).
69. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 110.
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70

licensee’s potential for innovation becomes.
If the licensor is in a
strong market position, exclusive grant-back clauses may therefore
71
harmfully limit competition.
72
Article 5(1)(c) TTBER is concerned with non-challenge provisions.
The parties are not precluded from agreeing on a termination right in
73
case the licensee challenges the IPR’s validity. The licensor shall not
be forced to maintain a contractual relationship with a party aiming to
74
destroy the basis of their contract. On the other hand, the Commission
does not allow an undertaking to draw competitive advantages from
75
invalid IPRs.
A licensee must therefore be able to act as any
uninvolved third party and be able to eliminate unjustified IPR-induced
76
protection from the market.
Article 5(2) TTBER prohibits terms that inhibit a licensee from
exploiting its own technology or limit his ability to do research and
77
development. Thus, this provision ensures that a licensee can freely
use and develop his own technology. As opposed to Article 4(1)(d)
TTBER, which contains the same provision, Article 5(2) is aimed at
78
non-competing undertakings. As can be seen from the categorization
as an “excluded provision,” the Commission feels less strongly about
79
such limitations between non-competing undertakings. Nevertheless,
they are not exempted.
4. Analysis
The TTBER is subject to different substantive and institutional
points of critique.
a. Substantive Issues
The reliance on market share thresholds has been widely criticized
80
as early as in the drafting stages of the TTBER while it has been

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(c).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 112.
77. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
78. Id. at arts. 4(1)(d), 5(2).
79. See also KORAH, supra note 21, at 70.
80. See Competition Law of Licensing Agreements Working Group, The Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Commentary, On the Draft
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simultaneously acknowledged that as of today no better approach is at
81
Nonetheless, the problem remains that a new product or
hand.
technology may create a new market. The IPR owner thereby would
hold a market share of 100 percent, which from the very start would
exclude him from the benefits of the TTBER if he chose to license his
IPR. Furthermore, while for “normal” products the market share is
82
already difficult to determine, this is even more so with regard to
technology or other subject matter of IPRs. From the outside, it will
hardly be possible to determine the different parts or details of a new
technology and, even less so, its substitutability with others’ or one’s
own technologies. Thus, mere inability to determine the market share
might already pose an insurmountable hurdle for IPR owners to benefit
from the TTBER.
Within the scope of the TTBER, the antitrust view on IP licensing
leads to hardly understandable results. For instance, according to
Article 4(1)(c)(i) TTBER, field-of-use restrictions between competitors
do not form a hardcore restriction and, thus, are exempted within the
83
market-share threshold of 20 percent according to Article 2 TTBER.
The argumentum e contrario then would be that beyond that market
share a field-of-use clause could or would form a restriction subject to
84
It is questionable, however, if a field-of-use
antitrust scrutiny.
restriction even is a restraint of competition that needs exemption
according to Article 81(3) ECT. In the preceding regulation, (EC)
240/96, the Commission expressly held the opinion that field-of-use
85
restrictions were “generally not restrictive of competition.”
Nevertheless, the argumentum e contrario set out above suggests that
the Commission has changed its view.
Such change of opinion might give rise to the objection of undue
interference with national legislation. According to the national laws,
IPRs confer upon their owner exclusive rights, which include the right to
Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Technology Transfer Agreements, and on the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Article
81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer_2/max_planck_en.pdf
81. See id. at ¶ 5.
82. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert, Converging Doctrines? US and EU Antitrust Policy for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Competition Policy Center, Paper CPC04-044, 11
(2004), http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC04-044 (Oct. 20, 2007).
83. TTBER, supra note 4, arts. 2, 4(1)(c)(i).
84. Although this need not necessarily result in invalidity, the mere subjectivity to
antitrust-scrutiny is—at least from a libertarian point of view—burdensome.
85. TTBER 240/96, supra note 4, arts. 2(1), (8) and Recital 22.
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grant exclusive or non-exclusive licenses. Both types of licenses can
limit the licensee to a specified form or field of use. Any violation of a
86
lawful limitation is subject to injunctive relief by the licensor. If now
with the suggested argumentum e contrario the Commission would
scrutinize field-of-use clauses in licensing agreements, it would arguably
second guess national legislation.
It is furthermore troublesome that the Commission will exempt
licenses that include “hardcore restrictions” only in exceptional
circumstances. This static view neglects that most technology licensing
is pro-competitive and can generate efficiencies, promote innovation,
and benefit consumers—an assessment presumably shared by the
87
Commission.
b. Institutional Issues
From an institutional point of view, the Commission’s antitrust
approach to IP licensing is problematic in two respects. First, the
TTBER provides for a shift of the burden of proof that is contrary to IP
laws. Generally, under IP laws, the challenging party (i.e., a frustrated
contracting party/licensee or third party) carries the burden of proof to
88
establish invalidity, unenforceability, or other improper conduct.
Under the TTBER, the Commission puts the heavy burden of proof
required by Article 81(3) ECT on the party alleging legality of the
89
agreement.
The IPR owner now has to prove the legality of the planned
90
measure. This includes an analysis of the relevant markets and the
market shares of all market participants in the relevant market. The
difficulties to define the relevant markets and market shares, especially
in the IP context, have been described above. A shift in the burden of
proof might deter an IP owner from licensing his rights. The shift,
therefore, potentially stifles licensing and the dissemination of
technology, thus defeating the purpose of the TTBER. On a broader

86. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000); Patentgesetz [German Patent Act] § 15(2) (1998).
87. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7.
88. Although “misuse” would be an example, this label was avoided as it might not fit
all European IP-law regimes.
89. See KORAH, supra note 21, at 171.
90. The opposite situation is possible, too, however. The IPR owner might want to end
a license agreement and could challenge its compliance with Article 81 ECT. In that case it
might be beneficial that the licensee carries the burden of proof. As this situation does not
reflect the IPR owner’s will to exploit his right but rather to retain it, it is not further
considered.
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legislative level, it is also questionable if this shift in the burden of proof
is reconcilable with national IP legislation or introduces a de facto
legislative change of national laws inconsistent with the division of
powers in the EU.
Secondly, the burden of proof seems to affect costs for the IPR
owner. Pre-exploitation assessment of legality now includes an in-depth
market analysis as well as a rather detailed analysis of the contract’s
implications on these markets. If IP laws mandated the first part of this
analysis (i.e., market analysis) at all, it would not have to be as detailed.
The additional costs resulting from this expanded analysis limit the
revenues that the IPR owner can reap from his right. Depending on the
field of technology, costs might even “eat up” the attainable licensing
fees.
Again, the Commission’s approach potentially counteracts
national IP legislation in effectively limiting the reward an IP owner can
obtain.
5. Conclusion
In sum, it appears that the Commission did not find a proper balance
of interests. Its antitrust-based approach appears to be static, neglecting
important pro-competitive aspects of IP licensing. It also potentially
interferes with national IP legislation by shifting the burden to prove
validity of a license agreement to the IP owner.
C. U.S. Antitrust Guidelines
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines provide a general framework of
antitrust concerns that could be raised by IP-license agreements. To
fully understand the importance of the Guidelines one must bear in
mind their development and the prior attitude in the United States
towards IPR licensing.
1. Antitrust Challenges to IP Licensing Prior to 1995
91

Despite the general impact the Sherman Act of 1890 had on
corporations, it did not initially affect the holders of IPRs in their
92
licensing activities. It was believed that IPRs, as “private property,”
93
entitled their holders to almost unfettered discretion. This discretion
94
extended to licensing and licensing restraints in particular.
91.
92.
93.
94.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 168-69.
Id.
Id.
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If challenged, licensing restraints typically fell within the “freedom
95
of contract.” This view is clearly expressed by the Supreme Court in
96
Bement and Sons v. National Harrow Co., where it stated that “the
general rule is absolute freedom . . . . [A]ny conditions which are not in
their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property . . . will be
upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep
97
up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.” Thus, at
this very early age, IPRs were actually upheld to a level of almost
sacrosanct existence.
Beginning in 1913, however, the Supreme Court subjected IPRs to
98
the “general law,” including the “positive prohibitions” of the
99
Sherman Act.
This new interpretation observed a tension between
antitrust laws and IPRs. This tension was based on the presumption
that IPRs confer upon their holders a “monopoly,” while the Sherman
Act aims to break up monopolistic structures and their anticompetitive
100
But, as it was the perceived purpose of the grant, the patent
effects.
101
Any conduct permitted by this
“monopoly” was seen as “lawful.”
lawful monopoly was therefore within a sphere of law that was strictly
separate from antitrust. With this “separate spheres” theory, the
monopoly power of the holder of an IPR was limited only in a
102
formalistic sense by the “metes and bounds” of the respective IPR.
Once the IP holder overstepped these boundaries, he subjected himself
to antitrust scrutiny, however.
Paradigmatic of this period were the “Nine No No’s” established by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in 1970. Those were
nine intellectual property licensing practices—oftentimes derived from
prior case law—that were “out of bounds” and would therefore attract
103
Although they have never clearly been
the scrutiny of the Agencies.
labeled as per se violations of antitrust laws, those practices were
described to lead “in virtually all cases . . . to antitrust trouble because

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 169.
186 U.S. 70 (1902).
Id. at 91.
Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917).
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1913).
Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
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of their adverse effect upon competition.”
follows:

104

The “No No’s” were as

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

tying of unpatented supplies,
mandatory grantbacks,
post-sale restrictions on resale,
tie-outs,
licensee veto power over licensor’s grant of further licenses,
mandatory package licensing,
compulsory payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably
related to sales of the patented product,
8. restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a
patented process, and
105
9. specifying prices chargeable on resale of licensed products.
A series of subsequent federal court decisions, legislative changes,
106
and changes in antitrust analysis called the basis of the “separate
spheres” theory and the validity of the “No No’s” into question. The
Supreme Court judgments in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
107
Inc. and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
108
109
In its judgments, the
Inc. may be highlighted as a turning point.
Supreme Court analyzed the substance, i.e., the actual effects the
challenged clauses had on competition. It furthermore expanded the
110
scope of the rule of reason.
2. 1995 U.S. Antitrust Guidelines
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines are highly influenced by this Supreme
Court’s new approach to antitrust analysis, which is especially evident in
the three presumptions the guidelines are based on: (1) Intellectual
Property is essentially comparable to any other kind of property; (2)

104. Id. at 179.
105. Id. at 179-80.
106. See id. at 189.
107. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (involving a territorial restraint in a franchise agreement
challenged to constitute a per se violation of Section 1 Sherman Act).
108. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (involving a blanket license that allegedly amounted to per se
unlawful price fixing).
109. Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 189-91.
110. Id. at 194. The rule of reason is explained infra Part I.C.2.a.
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111

IPRs do not create market power in the antitrust context; and (3)
112
The Agencies expressly state
licensing is generally pro-competitive.
that IPRs and antitrust laws “share the common purpose of promoting
113
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”
The Antitrust Guidelines address licensing of copyrights, patents,
114
trade secrets and know-how.
Trademark licenses are excluded from
115
The Agencies believe that, as with other property, certain
its scope.
types of conduct with respect to IPRs may have anticompetitive effects.
Thus, they apply general antitrust principles to IPR-licensing
agreements. Agreements concerning IPRs are, therefore, neither free
116
from antitrust scrutiny nor particularly suspect under antitrust laws.
The Agencies express their concern that IPR licensing might
facilitate market division or harm competition for the development of
new goods and services. Furthermore, they point out that license
agreements could foreclose access to a market, raise prices, or, through
117
coordinated practice, reduce output for a certain product.
In their evaluation of IPR licenses, the Agencies consider the
118
and
license’s impact on goods markets, technology markets,
119
innovation markets.
The Agencies stress that they will analyze
agreements based on their anticompetitive effects, not their
120
Assessment of the lawfulness is based on the “classic”
formalities.
121
standards in antitrust law: the rule of reason and the per se rule.
To
determine which test is applicable under the circumstances, the
Agencies assess whether the restraint in question can be expected to
111. While in 1995 this was not more than the opinion of law of two federal agencies,
this view has since been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in Illinois Tool
Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), that a patent does not necessarily confer market
power.
112. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.0, at 2.
113. Id. § 1.0, at 2.
114. Id. § 1.0, at 1.
115. Id. § 1.0, at n.1.
116. See id. § 2.1, at 3.
117. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 7.
118. Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its
close substitutes. Id. § 3.2.2, at 8.
119. Innovation markets become relevant where arrangements concern research and
development and the (not yet existing) product cannot be assigned to a certain goods market.
Id. § 3.2.3, at 10-11.
120. Id. § 3.1, at 7.
121. The per se rule will not further be explained. According to this rule certain
clauses are presumed to be anticompetitive regardless of the circumstances. Thus, they are
always prohibited and void without further analysis.
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contribute to an “efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
122
activity,” that is, whether the respective term helps the parties to
produce goods or render services more efficiently.
a. The Rule of Reason
According to the Agencies, the “vast majority” of agreements will be
123
This test inquires into
evaluated under the rule of reason standard.
124
the likelihood of anticompetitive effects of an agreement.
If a
restraint is found to likely cause anticompetitive effects, it is further
asked if this restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive
125
Even where a
benefits that outweigh the restriction of competition.
term is found to be obviously anticompetitive, the rule of reason may
126
still apply if the overall effect of the clause is efficiency enhancing.
Generally, the rule of reason analysis requires a comprehensive
127
market inquiry. Nevertheless, the Agencies reserve the freedom to
truncate this test where a restraint has no likely anticompetitive effect
(in which case the clause will be evaluated as reasonable) and where a
restraint facially appears to always or almost always cause
anticompetitive results without equally enhancing efficiency (in which
case the clause will be treated under the per se rule).
b. Differentiation between Horizontal and Vertical Relationships of
Licensing Parties
In the assessment of typical threats to competition arising from
license agreements, the Agencies differentiate between contracting
parties in a horizontal relationship (i.e., competitors) and parties in a
128
vertical relationship (i.e., non-competing undertakings).
Licensing agreements between competitors might often lead to or
even aim at the following: coordinated pricing, output restrictions,
acquisition or maintenance of market power, and retarding or restricting
129
the development of new or improved goods or processes. Agreements
between parties in a vertical relationship may, especially in connection

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 16.
Id.
Id.
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1985).
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16-24.
Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, at 16.
Id. § 3.3, at 13.
Id. § 4.1.1, at 18.
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with IPR licenses, often provide complementaries, and thus further
130
innovation and competition. On the other hand, they may also affect
competition in horizontal relationships either on the level of the licensor
or on the licensee’s level. The threats include foreclosure of access,
increased costs for inputs, coordination or increase of prices, or
131
restriction of output.
For both kinds of agreements, the Agencies acknowledge that the
actual competitive effect is dependent on the structure of the relevant
132
market.
Therefore, the difficulty to enter the market, the degree of
concentration in the market, and the responsiveness of supply and
133
Moreover, in
demand to changes in price may affect the analysis.
134
assessing a license term the Agencies also consider its duration and
135
The antitrust
the proportion of the markets the restraint affects.
evaluation of certain restraints may vary where a net of similar
restraints is set up in a market. While such nets of similar restraints may
be common and pro-competitive in one industry, they may well be
136
anticompetitive in another market.
c. Licensing Arrangements Involving Exclusivity
The Agencies identify exclusive licenses and exclusive dealing
provisions as agreements especially susceptible to raising antitrust
137
concerns.
Exclusive licenses restrict the right of the licensor to license to others
and possibly also to use the technology himself. They pose a threat to
138
competition where the parties are in a horizontal relationship.
Examples of such clauses that are examined under the rule of reason
analysis are cross licensing by parties collectively possessing market
139
power and grant-backs.
“Exclusive dealing” describes clauses that limit a licensee in
licensing, selling, distributing, or using technology that competes with
130. See Tom & Newberg, supra note 2, at 203.
131. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 18-19.
132. Id. § 4.1.1, at 18.
133. Id. (by employing these criteria the Agencies rely on the U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1.5, at 3.)
134. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 19.
135. Id. § 4.1.1, at 18.
136. Id. § 4.1.1, at 19.
137. Id. § 4.1.1, at 19-20.
138. Id. § 4.1.2, at 19.
139. Id.
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the licensed technology.
These terms may negatively impact
competition as they can foreclose market access or increase costs and
reduce output. On the other hand, they may (pro-competitively)
encourage a licensee to invest in research and development to further
141
the licensed technology or specialized applications thereto.
The Agencies point out that some of the just-named principles and
considerations are similar to those applied for evaluation of vertical
142
restraints outside the licensing context.
They stress, however, that in
the IP-licensing context the outcome of these considerations may vary,
as the risks to IPRs may justify some restrictions that are inadmissible in
143
another context.

d. Efficiencies and Justifications
If restrictions in an IP license agreement, after consideration of the
relevant market factors as described above, are unlikely to negatively
144
influence the market, the Agencies will not challenge the clause.
If
they find anticompetitive potential, however, they will balance these
anticompetitive effects with possible pro-competitive effects derived
from the restriction. If the restriction is after all “reasonably necessary”
145
to achieve pro-competitive efficiencies, it will remain intact.
The anti- and pro-competitive effects are reciprocal: the more
efficiency-enhancing a clause is, the more restrictions on competition
may be bearable. Conversely, even terms that significantly restrict
competition in a certain market may be acceptable upon proof of the
necessity of such clause due to the specifics of the relevant market or
146
industry.
As the Agencies take a practical, effects-based approach in their
evaluation, the context of the agreement is of vital importance. Thus,
proportionality becomes an issue as well. The objective of a certain
restriction might generally be pro-competitive; if there are less
restrictive means, however, by which the same results could be
achieved, the provision will be challenged. The Agencies stress that
only “realistic alternatives” will be taken into account, not theoretically

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.2, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 4.2, at 21.
Id.
Id.
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less restrictive clauses that are inapplicable in the business situation
147
faced by the parties.
Proportionality considerations can be influenced by limited
148
durations of a certain restriction. An anticompetitive restraint may be
important and justified for a limited period of time to protect interests
of the licensor, for example. Although the Agencies acknowledge that
they will refrain from drawing fine distinctions on the question of
duration, they will focus on durations that “clearly exceed[] the period
149
needed to achieve the procompetitive efficiency.”
e. Antitrust “Safety Zone”
Following the general idea that licensing of IPRs can promote
innovation and is generally pro-competitive, the Agencies want to
provide “some certainty” as to cases that do not face antitrust
150
151
concerns. To that end, the Agencies provide “safety zones.” Within
these zones, an agreement will not be challenged by the Agencies for
antitrust reasons. The argumentum e contrario does not work, however.
The mere fact that an agreement falls outside the scope of a safety zone
152
does not imply its unlawfulness.
It then is merely subject to antitrust
153
scrutiny according to the rules set out above.
The “safety zones” provide for the following: In the absence of
“extraordinary circumstances,” the Agencies will not challenge an
agreement if “(1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the
licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty
percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the
154
restraint.”
For the calculation of the market share, only the goods
markets will be determinative unless in the specific instance technology
markets are so important that without reference to them the effects of
155
the licensing arrangements would be inadequately addressed.
If mainly technology markets or innovation markets are concerned,
the second element of the test is changed and substituted by a “fourplus” test. If there are four or more independently controlled
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.2, at 21.
Id. § 4.2, at 22.
Id.
Id. § 4.3, at 22.
Id.
Id. § 4.3, at 23.
See id. See also supra Part I.C.2.a.
Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.3, at 22.
Id. § 4.3, at 23.
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technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties,
and those technologies are substitutable for the licensed technology at
comparable costs, licensing restraints affecting a technology market will
156
not be challenged.
3. Analysis
Having outlined the rule of reason approach as set forth in the
Antitrust Guidelines, it still is unclear exactly how clauses are evaluated.
The test does not propose elements that undertakings could employ to
narrow down the probable evaluation by the agencies. It does not even
clarify when the rule of reason standard is applied.
Naked price fixing for instance, is, according to the Agencies, a
157
facially anticompetitive restraint.
Generally, such clause would be
unlawful per se. The Agencies suggest, however, that this is only the
case where there is no efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
158
If, however, the opposite holds true, that is, an overall proactivity.
159
competitive effect remains, the rule of reason analysis will be applied.
As naked price fixing is facially anticompetitive, however, the Agencies
will also truncate the rule of reason test and, therefore, not “intensively”
inquire into efficiency-enhancing factors or analyze the particular
160
industry but, rather, directly challenge the clause.
Thus, the only clear evaluation is in the extremes. Clearly
anticompetitive restraints are challenged under the per se rule; clearly
pro-competitive restraints will not be challenged according to the
(truncated) rule of reason. The majority of clauses will not be that
easily categorized, however. Thus, for the majority of clauses, the
discretion of the Agencies remains such as to leave the undertakings
with almost no legal certainty.
The safety zones introduced in the Guidelines are of little help. The
discretion the Agencies allow themselves by disregarding the safety
zones in undefined “extraordinary circumstances” is but one issue.

156. With regards to innovation markets the test applies as follows: if four or more
independently controlled entities, in addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement,
possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in
research and development that is a close substitute of the research and development activities
of the parties to the agreement, an agreement affecting innovation markets will not be
challenged in absence of any facially anticompetitive restraints. See id. at 23.
157. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 16.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.

2008]

RECONSIDERING REGULATION OF IP LICENSING

73

Even in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the safety zones are
161
subject to the problems of market-share analysis set out above.
Regarding the “four-plus” test in innovation markets, this becomes
especially obvious. Research and development is kept secret for the
most part. Besides the difficulty of identifying possible other research
facilities (as new and small ones might be set up rather inconspicuously),
undertakings will also have to determine the substitutability of the
technologies including cost and (hypothetical market-) price
assessments.
These hurdles are so high that it appears likely most undertakings
planning an IP-license agreement will follow the Agencies’ suggestion
and ask for a preliminary evaluation. While on the one hand this
“service” of the Agencies might be applauded, it could also be critically
judged: by this means the Agencies develop the degree of monopolistic
decision power and control that in the EU has led to the current
legislation. The possibility of subsequent review by the courts offers
limited consolation. The Agencies’ opinion will carry major weight for
most undertakings and might have a deterrent effect in the decision
whether to ask for judicial review. This weight of first opinion might
also “spill over” into the courts, thus furthering an antitrust bias in IP162
license evaluation.
The preliminary review furthermore runs up costs not only for the
administration but also for the undertakings which might have to
comply with additional standards, calculate waiting time, and possibly
further negotiations both with the Agencies and with each other.
Additional costs occur in the case of subsequent judicial review. These
costs and especially the time factor might have stifling effects on
innovation the Agencies have not accounted for.
D. Comparison
A comparison of the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines is
possible on different levels. First, the focus will be the formal setup of
both bodies of rules. Then, a look is cast on the TTBER’s and Antitrust
Guidelines’ content. Lastly, again on a more formal level, the broader
institutional context from which both documents emerge will be
revisited.
161. Compare infra Part I.B.4.a.
162. See also William Kovacic, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property:
Redefining the Role of Competition Agencies, ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT, EU
AND US PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (Francois Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
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1. Formal Setup and Binding Force
The TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines both approach IPR
licensing as an antitrust problem. They cover the same subject matter—
163
patents, copyrights, know-how, and trade secrets.
Apart from that,
both sets of rules at first glance seem to be worlds apart.
The first difference is, of course, that the TTBER is secondary
legislation of the EU. As such, it is binding for member states and takes
direct effect on undertakings as well. If, for instance, undertakings in
their license agreement fixed resale prices, the entire agreement would
de jure be void. On the other hand, the Commission is bound as well. It
cannot charge undertakings for antitrust violations if they act in
accordance with the TTBER. The Antitrust Guidelines, on the other
hand, describe only a likely outcome of an evaluation. The Agencies
164
Nevertheless, it is not perceivable why the
are in no way bound.
Agencies or the courts would randomly depart from the Guidelines in
their evaluations of license agreements. Unless the Agencies had
previously announced a change of policy, an undertaking’s good faith
reliance on and compliance with the Antitrust Guidelines would
therefore probably result in judicial protection of their settled
165
Thus, a de facto binding effect of the Antitrust
expectations.
Guidelines exists. Therefore, the level of legal certainty or “binding
166
force” is, after all, not that different.
A difference appears to exist in the legal “mechanism” by which the
respective goals are achieved. From the outset, the Antitrust Guidelines
do not attempt to give certainty, but rather provide a framework for
analysis that will be employed equally, though possibly filled differently,
by the Agencies and undertakings. The TTBER, on the other hand,
provides clear-cut rules that should not allow for different
interpretations by the Commission and undertakings.
The difference in mechanism seems to stem from the political and
jurisdictional backgrounds. The need in the EU to unify the application
and understanding of antitrust laws does not allow for discretion on the
163. Differences do exist because of the different national subject matter of the IPRs in
the EU and different categorizations of, for example, patentable or copyrightable subject
matter.
164. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.0, at 1 and n.2.
165. For details on the argument of protected “settled expectations,” see, e.g.,
Christopher D. Pixley, Finding Middle Ground on Federal Retroactive Regulatory
Lawmaking, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 255 (1999).
166. A practical difference does exist, however: it is more difficult to claim protected
settled expectations than to prove adherence to a statute–here, the TTBER.
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side of the member states’ authorities. A comprehensive set of binding,
harmonized rules was needed. Furthermore, the objectives of EU and
U.S. antitrust laws are not identical. The EU’s antitrust laws prohibit
agreements that limit trade between member states and promote both
intra-technology as well as inter-technology competition. The U.S.
antitrust laws, on the other hand, apply to interstate commerce without
167
the specific objective to promote it.
A more practical political reason for these differences is the
Commission’s belief that administrative costs would be drastically
reduced by introducing the principle of de jure exceptions to technology168
transfer agreements. In this context, it is surprising that the Agencies
do not share this cost concern and explicitly stress the availability of
individual business review letters, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 50.6, by the
Department of Justice and Advisory Opinions of the Federal Trade
169
Commission pursuant to 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4.
In sum, the existing formal differences of the TTBER and the
Antitrust Guidelines seem to be the result of administrative and
political necessities. Despite those differences, both sets of rules
provide for legal certainty of some degree—a superficial view of
“binding” TTBER and “non-binding” Antitrust Guidelines falls short of
the application in reality.
2. Content
The content of both the TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines set
the boundaries in which IPR exploitation is regarded to comply with
antitrust legislation. The U.S. and the European assessments are not
fundamentally different.
Underlying the TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines is the notion that
technology licensing, that is, the proliferation of intellectual property, is
170
generally pro-competitive.
A shared general antitrust concern is that
agreements between competing undertakings (undertakings in a
horizontal relationship) are more likely to harm competition, thus

167. See Gilbert, supra note 82, at 13.
168. See Council Regulation 19/65/EEC, supra note 17.
169. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2007); see Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.0, at 1 and
n.2.
170. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.0, at 2; TTBER, supra note 4, at Recital 5.
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justifying harsher scrutiny, than agreements between non-competitors
171
(undertakings in a vertical relationship).
As to specific clauses, obviously a detailed comparison must remain
incomplete as not all clauses explicitly named in the TTBER are also
discussed in the Antitrust Guidelines. Under both sets of rules, the
“classical” antitrust violations—price-fixing, market-division and
allocation of markets, and output restraints—are strictly forbidden. The
concerns about exclusive licenses in their various forms, grant-backclauses, and the like, are also mutual.
3. Institutional Context
The treatment of licensing agreements in the TTBER and the
Antitrust Guidelines is somewhat ambivalent from the very beginning.
Both the Agencies and the Commission are administrative bodies
charged with the regulation of general fields of trade, commerce, and
competition. With this focus, their evaluation of license contracts is
necessarily driven by equally general economic and antitrust
considerations. IP interests might not be recognized, or at least might
be less recognized. While bias might be inherent in the work of any
172
specialized agency dealing with an “interface-issue,”
it appears
especially problematic in the IP-Antitrust interface. IP laws sensitively
balance public and private interests and already include economic
considerations. To blindly put antitrust considerations over IP laws
overemphasizes certain parts of the economic side of the scale (i.e. the
impact on competition) while neglecting others (e.g., economic “waste”
173
such as duplicative inventions) thus leading to an imbalance in the
underlying IP system. An imbalanced body of law, however, is prone to
allegations that it lacks justification.
E. Conclusion
With the new TTBER, antitrust evaluation of IP licensing in the EU
has made a substantial step towards the U.S. approach. In many
respects TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines are consistent. Some of the

171. See generally Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.1.1, at 18; TTBER, supra note
4, art. 4 (1), (2); see Gilbert, supra note 82, at 3.
172. See generally, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004) (for discussion on bias of
specialized agencies).
173. See Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, passim (2003).
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remaining differences do not necessarily come from different
substantive evaluations but from the legal background and framework,
174
i.e., the respective antitrust laws.
The question remains if the approach taken by the United States and
the EU is sensible. Regulation of IP licenses based on antitrust
considerations might be flawed for two reasons. First, it might block the
view on legitimate interests of IPR owners, and second, it might fall
short of a proper confinement of IP rights. It has been suggested above
that an antitrust-driven evaluation might also unbalance the IP system,
which could call into question its justification at large. Therefore, it
seems necessary to explore alternative ways of IP-license analysis. To
this end, the following Part II introduces an IP-driven approach to the
licensing of IPRs.
II. IP APPROACH TO IPR LICENSING
It appears that two problems in the context of IP licensing arise that,
although they each pose problems in and of themselves, are closely
intertwined. One question is if, from an IP perspective, the substance of
the Antitrust Guidelines or the TTBER have merit. To that extent,
some open questions, e.g., in the context of field-of-use clauses have
been identified.
Generally, the presumptions of possible
anticompetitive effects resulting from the clauses dealt with in the
TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines shall not be challenged further,
however. It shall be presumed—backed by the almost identical content
of both bodies of rules—that the clauses identified by the Agencies and
the Commission are all or almost all likely to be economically
detrimental.
It is a second question then that needs to be answered: Are these
substantive issues dealt with appropriately? The antitrust concepts
might in some cases—especially where the IPR owner is also a major
market power in the meaning of the antitrust laws—provide for good
guidance. However, it has been found before that a general analogy
from antitrust rules, such as the rule of reason, is misplaced in IP
175
licensing cases.
The underlying problem is that antitrust laws are
employed to tackle specific issues they are not able to address. The
grant of IPRs and their exploitation are so closely connected that the
interference with one of these parts will necessarily affect the other.

174. See Gilbert, supra note 82, at 13.
175. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Thus, when antitrust laws regulate IPR exploitation, they may easily
interfere with the substantive grant of the IPR.
The antitrust laws, although fit to evaluate general trade agreements,
were not designed to address these intricate problems of IPRs and,
176
therefore, lack the tools to adequately solve them.
If indeed, as the
Agencies and the Commission themselves state, most licensing
177
agreements will be in line with antitrust laws, it seems questionable
that, nevertheless, antitrust rules are provided for the residual amount
of agreements. Instead, the problem could be regulated from “within”
the IP laws and by the specialized agencies (for example, the Patent and
Trademark Offices) and courts that usually deal with IPRs.
The current approach entails the danger of unduly limiting or
redefining the grant of IPRs through the “back door.” Without express
alteration of the laws, IPR exploitation is limited by subjecting it to
antitrust scrutiny. The prominent approach is also susceptible to
changes in antitrust laws or policies, as well as the changes that might
occur in IP legislation. This “double sensitivity” is troublesome.
Instead of trying to apply antitrust standards, one should ask whether
the measures provided by the intellectual property laws as well as
generally applicable rules of law suffice to find doctrinally coherent and
yet practical solutions. Although IP laws are no self-contained regime,
they are, however, leges speciales when it comes to the rights and duties
178
of the IPR owner. They are to be considered prior to all other rules of
law when IPRs, their substance, or the scope of rights they confer are
determined. If indeed IP laws provided for sufficient means of
regulation, additional, or “extra-IP,” mechanisms would be misplaced.
Thus, the question arises whether the concerns raised by the antitrust
agencies regarding license agreements can be answered by the IP laws
themselves.
The answer to this question is determinative for the institutional
question it implies: if antitrust concerns can be adequately accounted
for in the interpretation of IP laws, what is the appropriate forum to
deal with these issues? Are the courts and specialized IP agencies
176. See Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 445 (1994).
177. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4.3, at 23; TTBER, supra note 4, at
Recitals 5, 12.
178. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND
ANTITRUST, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §1.3b, 1-14 (2002). “[I]t bears recognizing that patents and other intellectual
property rights limit the reach of the antitrust laws.” Id.
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equally or better capable of dealing with the very special antitrust issues
so as to ensure the concerns are addressed properly? And even if all
these questions are answered in the affirmative, it still has to be
answered why the derivation from the present approach would be
desirable.
A. Adequate Recognition of Antitrust Concerns in IP Law Interpretation
Antitrust laws aim to protect free competition, which is supposed to
lead to a maximum variety of goods and services available to the public
179
at the lowest possible price.
To determine if these public interest
considerations are already acknowledged or can be acknowledged in
IPR analysis, relevant general rules and principles of law are to be taken
180
But not only the underlying justifications of the
into account.
intellectual property law regimes, also the property aspect of IPRs can
be analyzed for its impact on the interpretation of IP laws.
1. Acknowledgement of Public Interests in IP Laws.
IPRs are granted to promote the sciences and useful arts for the
181
overall benefit of the public. The general notion of “public interest,”
therefore, already lies at the heart of all IP laws and forms a common
basis for both antitrust and IP laws. To meet the objective of overall
public benefit, IP laws set up a system that carefully balances the
(economic) incentives granted to the IPR owner with the potential
economic harm that is inherent in the exclusivity of the rights conferred,
e.g., economic “waste” created by duplicative inventive activity or
182
overproliferation of IPRs.
These potential economic harms are
183
“balanced off” with the statutory limitations of IPRs, namely the
limitations of the duration and the scope of the rights IP laws grant.
Through these statutory limitations, it is ensured that the maximum
amount of expressions and inventions are available in the public domain
as soon as possible without questioning the basic justification of IPRs.
In addition to these “statutory” public interest considerations, U.S.
courts have created the misuse doctrine as an additional mechanism to

179. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 178 § 1.3, at 1-12, citing WARD BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973).
180. The applicability of general rules of law has also been acknowledged by the U.S.
Supreme Court as early as 1917. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 513.
181. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
182. See Feldman, supra note 173, at 431.
183. See id. at 436.
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police abuses of IPRs.
Frischmann and Moylan have identified and
185
In its corrective
labeled three different functions of this doctrine.
function, the misuse doctrine can fill legislative gaps that cannot
186
otherwise be filled by statutory interpretation.
This corrective
187
function focuses on the internal coherence of IP laws and provides
boundaries for the exercise of IPRs in that it prohibits the expansion of
188
these rights beyond their lawful scope.
The misuse doctrine also
serves a coordinating function, which aims to reconcile inter-statutory
relationships, i.e., the relation between different IP statutes or IP
189
The misuse
statutes and other bodies of law as the antitrust laws.
doctrine provides courts with a dynamic tool to develop rules at the
interface of otherwise static statutes. In this function the misuse
doctrine can prevent IPRs from being utilized to undermine
190
Lastly, the misuse doctrine serves as a safeguard
competition.
mechanism to maintain the balance of interests and preserve the public
191
policies underlying the statutory schemes. This safeguarding function
192
is therefore concerned with the integrity of the IP system as such.
Through its corrective means, the misuse doctrine can address public
policy considerations in the IP laws themselves, e.g., acknowledge newly
discovered (competitive or economic) harms or newly discovered
interests of IPR owners and rebalance the IP system. The coordinating
function allows the direct introduction of antitrust concerns in an IP
analysis. In conjunction with the statutory limitations of IPRs, IP laws
therefore provide measures to deal with the interface of IPRs and
193
antitrust issues. If those means were fully and adequately employed,

184. HOVENKAMP, supra note 178 § 3.1, 3-12.
185. Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 865, 872 (2000).
186. Id. at 872-73.
187. Id. at 874.
188. HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2a, 3-6.
189. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 875 et seq.
190. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2a, at 3-7.
191. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 877.
192. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 3.2c, 3-8.
193. It has to be kept in mind that “misuse” is usually seen as an affirmative defense.
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 483, 523 (2006) (which would limit its use to very specific applications); see
Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 573. The point here
is, however, that the underlying rationales are generally available.
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an external antitrust-specific approach to IP licensing would seem
194
unnecessary.
2. Public Interest Considerations Through “Property” Notion of IPRs
The misuse doctrine is very specific to the U.S. jurisdiction, which, in
this context, would leave the EU perspective on the treatment of IP
195
licenses under antitrust laws unaltered.
In addition, even in the
United States the misuse doctrine is only partially settled and partly still
196
contested.
Therefore, the availability of a more universal alternative
approach to introduce public interest considerations into IPR analysis
should be examined. Such an approach could be found in the
contention that intellectual property is essentially equal to any other
197
form of property.
On this underlying presumption, the following hypothesis can be
based: If the grant of (tangible) property rights is subject to public
interest considerations, and tangible and intellectual property are
essentially equal, IPRs must be subject to public interest considerations
as well. If then, through this property notion, the public interests
protected by antitrust laws can be acknowledged in the interpretation of
IP laws, an “external” antitrust-driven approach would be superfluous.
Property is inherently relational. It is embedded in the social
relations among individuals on the one hand and the individual’s or
property owner’s relation to the state as grantor and protector of
198
property on the other hand.
This “relationality” and the allocative
199
effects of private property render it subject to restrictions. On a
constitutional level, European Constitutions as well as the U.S.
Constitution provide for a restriction in the form of provisions allowing
200
This restriction on property can generally only be
for expropriation.
194. The adequate recognition is directly tied to the institutional question, i.e., if the IP
agencies and courts are an adequate or even better forum for such decisions. See infra Part
II.C.
195. Although similar results could be achieved in the EU via general civil law
doctrines. See, e.g., for Germany, C. CIV. [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch] § 242, generally
prohibiting the misuse of rights.
196. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 185, at 867-68.
197. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2004) and passim; Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 4, § 2.0, at
2.
3
198. See Madhavi Sunder, IP , 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-85 (2006).
199. See GREGORY ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY 5 (2006).
200. Id. at 6.
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justified by a public need and is conditioned on compensation.
This
limitation to property is—although based on public policy
considerations—only relevant in relation to the state as a mediator of
public interests, however. Private parties can generally not trigger
202
expropriation measures to their benefit. Therefore, expropriation for
purposes of this Article can only serve as one example of the limitations
of property rights without particular regard to antitrust-specific public
interest limitations.
It is the sub-constitutional limitations, therefore, that must be
examined. The use of tangible property, although undisputedly an
203
absolute right conferring the power to exclude, is firstly subject to the
conflicting rights of others.
It is part of the aforementioned
“relationality” of property that the exercise of property rights may not
204
interfere with or violate proprietary positions of third parties.
Easements, servitudes, or the laws of nuisance are general examples of
legal limitations of property rights induced by social or public policy
205
considerations.
On a more concrete note, courts have considered social obligations
to limit the use of property in the so-called “rent cases.” It was held that
the quasi-monopolistic position of the landlords, which gave them
power over their tenants, e.g., to increase rents at will, was to be
206
The Supreme Court has stated that as “space . . . is
limited.
necessarily monopolized in comparatively few hands,” public interest
207
justified “some degree of public control.”
If no public control was

201. Id. at 6-7.
202. Although companies have sometimes indirectly triggered expropriations by
threatening to move their operations, for example, if they did not get additional land to
expand their businesses. Authorities were then inclined to expropriate, claiming that the
creation of new jobs, increase in tax revenues, etc., through the respective business was a
legitimate public use, justifying the taking. This practice has been upheld by courts. See, e.g.,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
203. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1979); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
204. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887). “[A]ll property in this country is
held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious to the
community.” Id. (citations omitted).
205. See Carrier, supra note 197.
206. See generally Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155-57 (1921).
207. Id.
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imposed, the right holder could not only use, but also freely abuse, his
208
power to the detriment of those dependent on him.
IP-licensing cases provide for a situation comparable to the rent
cases. While a certain good—the intellectual property—is monopolized,
the potential demand is numerous, thus giving the IP owner seemingly
unlimited power over the demanders. Thus, a certain degree of public
control, i.e., the consideration of public interests to limit the exercise of
209
IPRs, is justified.
The public interests antitrust laws aim to protect—the greatest
possible variety of goods and services for the lowest possible price—can
therefore be factored in a genuine IPR analysis. It seems that from this
perspective, recourse to antitrust law seems both unnecessary and
210
methodologically questionable.
B. Testing the Assumptions
It has been suggested that IP laws provide for different “internal”
means to protect the public against excessive use or exploitation by the
IP owner. First, the misuse doctrine was introduced to provide a “door”
through which antitrust concerns could enter IP law analysis. Where
misuse doctrines are unavailable or not clearly applicable, the
“property” notion inherent in IP, especially the “social function” of
property has been suggested to allow for another possibility to take
antitrust concerns into account.

208. The situation concerning IPRs might be slightly different, as IPRs are generally
not crucial to survive (as is living space). However, in case of key patents or interface
patents, the detriment of the licensee is comparable.
209. See also Block, 256 U.S. at 157 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the
application of the Court’s reasoning to all forms of property). “If the public interest may be
concerned, as in the statute under review, with the control of any form of property, it can be
concerned with the control of all forms of property.” Id. See also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at
976. “We are of the view, . . . that . . . copyright and patent law serve parallel public
interests,” and “[t]he need…to protect its investment does not outweigh the public’s right
under our system to expect competition and the benefits which flow therefrom.” Id. at 97678; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974) (stating that copyrights
“must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability . . . for the general
public good.”).
210. This view stands in diametrical contrast to the Agencies’ analysis. See Antitrust
Guidelines, supra note 3, at 3. That is not to say that intellectual property is in all respects the
same as any other form of property. Intellectual property has important characteristics, such
as ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from many other forms of property. These
characteristics can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not
require the application of fundamentally different principles. Id.
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The question now is how this alternative IP-driven approach
addresses the concerns expressed in the TTBER and the Antitrust
Guidelines.
1. Example 1—Same Results (Price Fixing)
Both TTBER and the Antitrust Guidelines strictly prohibit price
211
fixing as a hardcore restriction and per se violation of antitrust laws.
From an IP-law perspective, forcing the licensee to charge his customers
a certain price, i.e., fixing prices on the resale level of the licensed IP or
the product produced with the IP, is beyond the scope of the IPR grant
as well. While it is the IPR owner’s choice to license the IPR at
whatever price he wishes, his monetary interests are satisfied upon
licensing. There is no right embedded in the IPR to control the further
marketing or sales. Thus neither TTBER nor the Antitrust Guidelines
would be needed to eliminate such licensing terms. The same result
would be achieved by interpretation of the relevant IP laws, in this case
even without further use of the misuse doctrine.
2. Example 2–Different Results (Use of Licensee’s Technology)
Article 5(2) TTBER forbids restrictions on the licensee to exploit his
212
own technology where the parties are non-competitors.
Since the
EU’s antitrust law is also concerned with intra-technology competition,
this rule seems sensible from the antitrust perspective. Where a licensee
has enough know-how in the respective industry as well as the relevant
assets to further innovation, he is a (potential) source of innovation and
thus competition in the market, which the licensor must not block. The
Agencies, on the other hand, would not render such restriction invalid,
as they do not require an undertaking to create competition in its own
213
field.
If one reads the IP laws as conclusive and per se balanced, following
the IP approach, such licensing terms could not be enforced. While
IPRs confer inter alia the rights to use, to exclude, and to protect against
abuse of the IPR by third parties, taking influence on licensees’
businesses is beyond the legal power the IPR grants. The protection of
the IPR does not require any further control over the licensee’s
activities.
211. TTBER, supra note 4, art. (2)(a), 4(1)(a); Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 4, §
5.3.
212. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
213. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 7.
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This time, therefore, a mutual IP approach—although in line with
EU antitrust laws—alters the U.S. antitrust approach. As it is more
restrictive than the current approach, the Agencies are unlikely to
enforce it. The courts could nevertheless hear a case and could find the
license agreement unenforceable because of undue expansion of the
IPR’s scope. On the other hand, they would be able to take into
account the specific interests of U.S. antitrust laws and hold that such
restriction of the licensee does not run counter to antitrust principles or
public policies and thus does not amount to misuse within the meaning
of the respective statutes.
C. Implications of the IP Approach
The established antitrust-based regulation of IP licenses has
produced workable results. Nevertheless, this Article so far suggests
that there might be a better solution—the reform or adaptation of the
214
IP Agencies’ and courts’ work.
This Section points at some
implications of the presumed better solution—the “IP Approach.”
1. General Benefits
Example 2 has shown one possible benefit of the proposed
approach: strict application leads to results that are coherent with the
scope of IPRs while also satisfying the stricter of two antitrust regimens.
It allows enough flexibility, however, to take into account a lower
standard of antitrust control that in this case allowed for an
“overreaching” exploitation of the IPR. The new approach suggests
other benefits, too. From a doctrinal point of view, it seems beneficial
to solve issues that are provoked by the exercise of IPRs, i.e., licensing,
with the tools provided by the IP laws. Thereby it is ensured that in
dealing with the complicated interface issues the IP interests are
properly construed and acknowledged as well as confined.
2. Institutional Implications
It has been argued above and elsewhere that any solution of the
“interface-dilemma” must reach beyond the mere balancing of
215
economic interests inherent in antitrust cases.
It is important to
acknowledge and further the balance of interests Congress or the other
legislative bodies have made in passing the IP laws, while adapting IP

214. See also Kovacic, supra note 162, at 4.
215. See Feldman, supra note 173, at 400.
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laws (and their application) to today’s realities.
The antitrust
agencies—despite their statements in the Antitrust Guidelines and the
TTBER—are neither particularly experienced in “IP-thinking” nor do
216
they have a genuine interest in preserving the IPR system. They alone
are not fit to perform such adaptation. If IPR interpretation in the field
of licensing is left to them, soon a mere economic-driven approach will
be likely to appear. Due to their highly specialized expertise, they are
217
prone to overlook genuine IP issues they are not familiar with.
IP licensing occurs in quickly changing technological environments.
To understand the technologies a constant update in knowledge is
necessary.
The
economic
considerations
driving
antitrust/anticompetition policies in comparison are rather static. The
IP Agencies (e.g., the PTOs), by their everyday work, are exposed to
the latest changes in the industries and therefore, “automatically” kept
up to date. For the Antitrust Agencies, on the other hand, timely and
costly constant knowledge updates would be necessary to enable them
to make sensible and informed decisions. Without such knowledge
updates, however, the recognition of the IPR owners’ and the public’s
218
interests in the application of IP laws is threatened.
It is due to these dynamics (static economic policy developments vs.
fast-changing technologies) that the institutions dealing with IPRs right
now—the PTOs, national agencies in Europe, and the courts—seem to
be better suited to govern the licensing of IPRs. They have the
expertise in IP law without being particularly biased either towards
219
antitrust concerns or towards IPRs.
They are, on the other hand, far
from oblivious to overreaching exploitation of IPRs. They are used to
dealing with cases of misuse or other unlawful IPR exercise. It is easier
for them to acknowledge or stress certain competition concerns in the
analyses they are used to performing than it is to instruct an antitrust
agency and have it obey the intricacies of IP laws. Thus, it appears that
the IP Agencies and courts are best equipped to calibrate the IP system
220
to account for antitrust concerns that licensing activities might raise.

216. Id. at 401. See also Kovacic, supra note 162, at 1.
217. Id. at 1.
218. See Feldman, supra note 173, passim.
219. See Dreyfuss, supra note 172, at 770 (describing how initial concerns about a propatentee bias of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abated. There is no conceivable
reason why this should be different for other specialized IP agencies or courts.).
220. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 395, 402 (2007).
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3. Costs
The new suggestion further seems to be more cost efficient. In the
current system, the parties to a licensing agreement as well as the
Agencies incur costs through the administrative review proceedings and
possibly additional litigation. In the proposed setting, only costs from
litigation occur. As these costs are borne by parties, this seems to be a
natural limitation on the number of suits brought. This self-restraint
entails positive effects for competition and economy in general: while
anticompetitive licensing may still occur, insignificant restraints will go
untried as the parties are not willing to bear the costs and risks of a
lawsuit. Major restraints will be tried, however. By this “natural
selection,” the specialized agencies and the courts are made aware of
the actual challenges to IP laws and can sensibly react. While serving as
an indicator of the nuisances in IP laws, the public bears lesser costs due
to reduced government activity.
The suggested approach does bear costs, as well. The incorporation
of antitrust analysis in the IP Agencies’ and courts’ procedures and
analyses is possible only if those bodies’ economic expertise is
strengthened. This entails education, hiring new staff, and possibly
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structural changes that produce costs. These costs, for the most part,
seem to be one-time costs, however. Once changes are implemented
only very limited further “time-to-time” training will be needed to
educate officials about the latest relevant economic ideas. As has been
pointed out above, economic theories are less likely to change, so that
related educational expenses do not seem to present a major concern.
D. Conclusion
The hypothesis that antitrust concerns in the context of IPR
licensing could adequately be addressed by the IP laws themselves
without recourse to antitrust mechanism raised the question which
institutional implications such an approach might have. It has been
suggested that an institutional change away from the antitrust agencies
to the specialized IP agencies and courts is needed. While this
suggestion entails costs, it was argued that in the long term, regulation
of IP licensing through the IP agencies and courts would be both
cheaper as well as preferable from a doctrinal point of view.

221. See Dreyfuss, supra note 172, at 792.
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SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS
This Article did not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of
all possible licensing terms in all possible settings of undertakings and
markets. By examining the Antitrust Guidelines and the TTBER, it
showed different things, however. First, that two major jurisdictions
share mutual antitrust concerns in the context of IPR licensing. Second,
both jurisdictions tackle the perceived problem through their specialized
antitrust mechanisms and agencies.
This perception and approach has been criticized. While the
substantive concerns as present in the TTBER and Antitrust Guidelines
purposely remained basically unchallenged, the institutional setting has
been questioned. It has been suggested that the issues (if correctly or
not) identified are better dealt with by agencies and courts specialized in
dealing with IPRs. It has been shown that the concerns underlying and
driving antitrust policy can be accounted for under regular IP analysis.
Thus, for doctrinal and cost-efficiency reasons, it was argued that the
evaluation of IPR licensing agreements should be transferred to a
different forum—the specialized IP Agencies and courts.
A question not dealt with in this Article is the implementation of the
suggestions set forth. It seems possible, however, in the United States
to revoke the Antitrust Guidelines and, as the case may be, establish
new procedural rules. In the EU, the TTBER could also be revoked or
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To the extent that the TTBER
simply not renewed once it expires.
has led to adaptations of national antitrust laws, these adaptations
possibly need to be changed.

222. TTBER, supra note 4, art. 11, (stating that the regulation is limited in time and
expires April 30, 2014).

